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1ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW1. Whether it violates commercial telemarketers’ First Amendment rights to leave toresidential telephone subscribers only the choice of placing their telephone numbers on anational registry, while vesting exclusively in the government the right to decide, based oncontent, which calls to numbers on the registry are blocked and which are not?2. Whether it violates commercial telemarketers’ First Amendment rights todiscriminate between commercial and noncommercial telemarketing solicitations where thegovernment has proffered no demonstrable correlation for this discriminatory treatment andits interest in preventing unwanted calls?3. Whether the government met its burden of demonstrating it materially advancesits interest in reducing unwanted telephone solicitations when it prohibits unwanted callsfrom only a subset of commercial telemarketers, while leaving completely unaddressed thelarge volume of equally unwanted calls from noncommercial telemarketers?4. Whether the government has met its burden of demonstrating there were noother obvious, more narrowly tailored alternatives – other than a blanket “do-not-call”registry that substantially burdens commercial speech – when the government was presentedwith an array of less restrictive alternatives that materially reduce unwanted commercialtelemarketing calls, including, among others, strengthened company-specific do-not-callrules, which the government never bothered to enforce or publicize?5. Whether the government may impose a fee on selected telemarketers as aprecondition for engaging in protected speech where the government will use the funds itcollects for general agency administration? STATUTESAll pertinent statutes and regulations are attached to the government’s brief.
2STATEMENT OF THE CASEThis case is a cautionary tale about what happens when federal agencies allowperceived political imperatives to override legal and constitutional concerns.  Since 1992, theFCC, later joined by the FTC, has had company-specific “do-not-call” rules requiringtelemarketers to honor individual requests to stop placing calls.  The vast majority oftelemarketers followed these rules and most consumers who used them found that theyworked to limit the number of calls received.  But most people did not know of their rightsunder the law, which neither agency ever enforced.  Accordingly, the FTC and FCCconcluded the old rules had failed – notwithstanding widespread public ignorance andabsence of agency enforcement – and adopted the national “do-not-call” registry (“DNCR”)which, once a consumer registers, imposes a blanket preemptive ban on certain commercialcallers selected by the government.  However, the agencies also decided, incongruously, thatcompany-specific rules are effective, at least for certain callers, such as commercial callcenters making calls for non-profit entities.  The public, largely unaware of its rights underthe prior regulation, enthusiastically supported the new rules that are only now being widelypromoted (for the first time).The DNCR violates basic First Amendment principles that the TCPA requires thegovernment to consider.  It imposes excessively restrictive regulations despite the fact thatthe agencies themselves found less onerous alternatives would work – most obviouslyeducating the public and enforcing and strengthening their other rules.  The FTC and FCCadopted the measure heedless of the widespread adverse consequences for honesttelemarketers, whose concerns were brushed aside without analysis.  They also riddled theDNCR with exceptions that limit its ability to serve its purported purpose under the dubious
3premise that some speakers have First Amendment rights that others do not.  Two districtcourts below correctly found that the agencies acted illegally.
1  H. REP. 103-20 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1629.  See also Cong. Rec. H 6160 (July 25, 1994)(statement of Rep. Swift) (bill “does not impose further restrictions on the legitimate telemarketingindustry” but rather “target[s] strictly … telemarketing fraud, deception and other patterns of clearlyabusive telemarketing activities); id. at 6161 (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (telemarketing fraud “alsodamages the legitimate honest telemarketers who rely upon telecommunications technology tomake … goods and services more readily available to the American public”).2  Know Your Caller Act Hearing at 27 (P.A. 0676) (statement of Eileen Harrington).
3  DNC-TR. at 104-05 (P.A. 0583-84) (statement of Eileen Harrington) (“We don’t hear nearly thelevel of concern from the public about [‘do-not-call’] that we do … about misrepresentation and fraud”so “we … are concerned about real economic injury … when money is taken out of consumers’pockets”). 4
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUNDA. The Telemarketing Act, TCPA, and Initial RulesThe DNCR rules under review are the product of two federal agencies actingpursuant to two different laws, only one of which was focused on unsolicited telephone calls.The Telemarketing Act, under which the FTC launched the initial actions leading to theserules, says nothing about “do-not-call” mandates, but rather targets crimes perpetrated viatelemarketing.  H. REP. 103-20 at 2, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1627.  It authorizes FTC “rulesprohibiting deceptive telemarketing … and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices,”15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1), with a primary focus on illegal activities, not honest telemarketing.Congress was concerned with “unscrupulous activities from which no one benefits but theperpetrator” and sought “equitable balance between … stopping deceptive (includingfraudulent) and abusive telemarketing activities and not unduly burdening legitimate businesses.” 1As a result, the FTC’s enforcement priorities through 2000 focused almost entirely onfraud, which the agency identified as a problem distinct from unsolicited calls.  In a fifth-yearreview of its rules, the FTC reported to Congress “we have a lot of complaints abouttelemarketing, [but] almost all of them concern allegations of fraud.  Only about 1 in 10 …concern unwanted calls.” 2  Consequently, FTC enforcement efforts were directedexclusively toward fraud.  Indeed, at a 2000 workshop, FTC Assistant Director of MarketingPractices Eileen Harrington stated, in response to comment that the agency never enforcedthe company-specific opt-out requirement, “you’re absolutely right, that our enforcementpriority has been fraud, and it will continue to be fraud until there isn’t any more fraud.  Thatwas why this rule was issued primarily.”  DNC-Tr. at 104. (P.A. 0583)  The FTC considered“do-not-call” issues to be completely separate, and of far lesser priority. 3  This changed afterthe agency placed adoption of the DNCR at the top of its policy agenda.By sharp contrast, the FCC acted pursuant to the TCPA, which “recognizes thelegitimacy of the telemarketing industry.”  First TCPA Order at 8753.   The TCPA directedthe FCC to ensure that any “do-not-call” regulations maintain an appropriate balancebetween commercial interests and privacy concerns while meeting constitutional standards.S. Rpt. 102-177 at 6.  As originally proposed, the TCPA would have required the FCC toimplement a national “do-not-call” registry.  Id. at 4-6.  However, the proposed mandate wasreplaced with a directive to consider alternatives and adopt balanced regulations meetingconstitutional standards.  Id at 4-5.  See also H. Rep. 102-317 at 19.
4  Gov’t Br. 7-8 (citing First TCPA Order at 8760-61).
5
Congress made a “public policy determination” to exclude political and othernoncommercial calls from the initial rules, in part because “the record … does not containsufficient evidence” regarding how welcome those calls are, and it merely “suggested” mostunwanted calls are commercial.  H. Rep. 102-317 at 16.  See also infra at 39-40.  However,Congress acknowledged “charitable or political calls might [in some cases] represent asserious a problem as commercial solicitations” and added “a special requirement” that theFCC “consider whether there was a need for additional authority [over] telephonesolicitations” from these sources.  H. Rep. 102-317 at 16-17 (specifying 47 U.S.C.§ 227(c)(1)(D)).  Congress also clarified that its “reference … to [consumers] who object toreceiving certain classes or categories of telephone solicitations” in “the languageauthorizing … a single national database” was “intend[ed to] be interpreted as including …commercial, charitable and political” solicitations, and “to work hand-in-glove with therequirement … to consider whether additional authority is needed.”  Id. at 23 (citing47 U.S.C. §§ 227(c)(3), (c)(1)(D)).In its first TCPA rulemaking, weighing these statutory factors, the FCC declined toadopt a national “do-not-call” registry.  It did so not just because a registry would be “costlyand difficult to establish and maintain,” as the government now suggests, 4 but for otherreasons as well.  A major factor was the inherent imprecision in a registry approach, whichthe FCC found would not help consumers seeking “to maintain their ability to chooseamong those … from whom they do and do not wish to hear.”  First TCPA Order at 8761.  Italso noted that consumers wishing to block every call would be disappointed, as those whoregistered “would still receive calls from exempted businesses or organizations.”  Id. at8758-59.  In contrast, the FCC found company-specific “do-not-call” rules would“represent[ ] a careful balancing of the privacy interests … against commercial speech rightsof telemarketers and the continued viability of a valuable … service.”  Id. at 8766.  See also id.at 8757.The FCC reached similar conclusions in an earlier proceeding regardingconstitutionally balancing “do-not-call” requirements.  In 1980 the FCC found “allsolicitation calling – whether for charitable, political or business purposes – involves similarprivacy implications,” and noted it had “no information that [consumers] would find anadvertising message more offensive than a request for a charitable contribution or a politicalmessage or solicitation.”  FCC NOI Order, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1035.  It noted in particular that“[e]xempting calls made for political and charitable solicitation or … research purposes fromregulations” would “raise serious constitutional questions [absent] significant practicaldifferences between unsolicited commercial and non-commercial calls.”  Id.
5  Remarks of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond,The Privacy 2001 Conference, Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 4, 2001), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm.  6  FCC NPRM at 17478 (FCC “does not intend in this NPRM to seek comment on the exemptionas it applies to political and religious speech.”); see also id. at 17478-79 (same).6
B. DNCR RulesThe drive for a national “do-not-call” list began in October 2001 when new ChairmanTimothy J. Muris pledged to create a registry as a top FTC priority. 5  The FTC announced a“privacy agenda” and placed creating the registry at the top of its “to do” list.http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/privacyagenda.htm.  By year-end 2002, the FTC held apress conference at which the Chairman stated, among other things, that the FTC adoptedrules fulfilling his DNCR promise.  See FTC Order.  Actions by Congress and the FCCfollowed shortly thereafter.Because the FTC acted before it had either specific statutory authority or funding, seeU.S. Security v. FTC, 2003 WL 22203719 *5 (W.D. Okla. 2003), it had to go to Congress,which responded with the Implementation Act, authorizing the FTC to set fees sufficient toimplement and enforce the registry.  Implementation Act § 2.  It authorized the FTC tocharge telemarketers a fee to obtain the registry access needed in order to place telemarketingcalls (including to consumers not enrolled), without questioning the FTC’s claim that itrequired approximately $18 million annually for the registry.  The Act also established adeadline for FCC review of its rules that commenced a couple of months before the FTCacted, and it ordered the FCC to “consult” with the FTC to “maximize consistency” betweenthem. Congress stated it did not intend to “dictate the outcome of the pending FCCrulemaking,” or to “foreclose consideration of … factors” required by the TCPA, and itemphasized the FCC remained bound by the TCPA balancing requirements.  H. Rep. 108-8at 9.  Nevertheless, the FCC interpreted the Implementation Act as a requirement toduplicate the FTC’s rules, and adopted essentially identical regulations.  See generally FCCOrder.  It consequently all but ignored its duty under the TCPA and First Amendment tobalance the impact of the new rules on legitimate telemarketing with privacy interests.  Withrespect to the impact on telemarketers, the FCC offered only a conclusory dismissal that itwas “not persuaded … a national do-not-call list will unduly interfere with the ability oftelemarketers to contact customers,” id. at 14039, echoing the one-sentence “analysis”offered earlier by the FTC that, though the rules might eliminate 40 to 60 percent ofcommercial telemarketing, it would somehow benefit the industry.  FTC Order at 4631-32.The FCC also ignored the requirement in Section 227(c)(1)(D) to collect data on whether toextend regulation to political or charitable calls. 6The new FTC and FCC rules prohibit selected commercial entities, and for-profittelemarketers, from calling consumers on the national registry.  Political solicitations arenever regulated, charitable solicitations conducted by call centers (but not by in-housecallers) are subject to company-specific requirements, and otherwise exempt businesses usingcall centers are fully subject to the rules, including the DNCR.  FTC Order at 4584-85, 4587,4589, 4636-37.  The agencies exempted certain commercial callers from using the registry,including circumstances where a business has obtained prior express written consent from
7  The government cites no source for this claim.  However, its own record revealed 40 percent ormore of “do-not-call” complaints relate to political and noncommercial callers.  E.g., June 2002 Tr. at206. (P.A. 0626)  See also ATA Comments at 72-73. (P.A. 0123-24)  The FTC’s own staff observed that“personally, I get a lot of calls from nonprofits, and even when I ask not to get any more calls, I keepgetting them.”  DNC-Tr. at 160. (P.A. 0594)  Id. at 75 (P.A. 0573) (FTC staff testimony that “nonprofits[are] the biggest problem”). 7
the called party, and where a business has an “established business relationship” with thecalled party.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(c), (f)(9)(i)-(ii).Shortly after the FCC acted, the FTC announced fee rules applicable to both agencies’regulations.  16 C.F.R. § 310.8; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(i)(E).  The rules require payment offees as a precondition to making telemarketing calls.  16 C.F.R. § 310.8(a)-(b).  The FTCadopted this structure to collect from telemarketers the $18.1 million Congress authorizedfor the registry’s first-year costs, an amount exceeding 10 percent of the FTC’s annualbudget.  2003 Appropriations Act at 95.C. Rulemaking RecordThe government defends its new rules based on enforcement history and therulemaking record.  It describes as a “major consideration” the “experience of consumersand enforcers of the company-specific rules” – particularly its own enforcement experience –culminating in a finding of “great public dissatisfaction with that provision.”  Gov. Br. at 12.The government’s brief frequently refers to agency findings, but without citing any specificfacts.  E.g., id. at 22 (“rulemaking records”), 28 (problems with company-specific rules), 37(DNCR “grew out of the agencies’ enforcement experience”), 42 (DNCR “is an outgrowthof the agencies’ experience”), 49 (“the FTC had substantial evidence that the company-specific approach was insufficient”).  The government also suggests “there were no similarreports of dissatisfaction with respect to noncommercial telemarketing,” id. at 12, acharacterization unsupported by the record. 7Contrary to these conclusory references, the record indicated that most people wereunaware of the “do-not-call” rules, neither the FTC nor the FCC ever enforced them, thosewho made “do-not-call” requests found the rules worked, and most deficiencies thegovernment cited were addressed through other new rules.  In addition, other less restrictive“fixes” were overlooked.  Overall, the record failed to support any claim that the volume ofcalls defeated less restrictive solutions, or that commercial callers are “fundamentallydifferent” from noncommercial callers.Widespread Ignorance.  It is difficult to understand the government’s finding of“great public dissatisfaction” with the company-specific rules since the record conclusivelyshows the vast majority of citizens were entirely ignorant of their existence.  Amicus AARPtestified about its survey “finding less than 5 percent of the people … across the countryare even aware that a do-not-call provision is in effect.”  DNC-Tr. at 93. (P.A. 0577)  See alsoid. at 28. (P.A. 0572)  NARUC testified that the vast majority of consumers in one state-widepoll knew nothing about company-specific do-not-call options.  Id. at 92. (P.A. 0576)  See alsoid. at 141 (NARUC testimony that “there is a general lack of awareness”); id. at 183 (P.A.0595) (citing “general consensus” of a lack of consumer awareness); id. at 107 (P.A. 0586)(NCL did not “know of any national surveys that have asked” about awareness “and …
8  Pechnik at 12. (P.A. 0334)  Amicus AARP also informed the FCC that research the AARP hadconducted “has shown a pretty significant lack of knowledge of … the do not call right[.]”  RR-Tr. at408. (P.A. 0642)9  The FTC staff noted “there’s nothing … more valuable than effective education of consumers[.]”RR-Tr. at 406. (P.A. 0640)  See also DNC-Tr. at 188 (P.A. 0600); News Release, New Year’s Resolutions forTelecom Consumers, ¶ 5 (CGB Dec. 31, 2002).10  See (P.A. at 0716-18) (“TSR Sweeps” provided by FTC under Freedom of Information Act, 5U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”), listing 87 cases alleging violations of the TSR, but none involving unwanted callprovisions, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.4(b)(1)(ii) or 310.4(b)(2)(i)-(iv)).11  DNC-Tr. at 10 (P.A. 0571) (FTC’s “own complaint data” show “telemarketing fraud hasdropped as a complaint category in terms of its standing in our top ten”).8
that’s something that really needs to be done before … formulat[ing] solutions”).  The FCCrecord revealed the same problem.  Indeed, one comment cited by the FCC to support theregistry explained that a primary reason “company specific do-not-call lists have been adismal failure” was “[t]he public’s ignorance of its use.” 8  Both agencies agreed greaterpublic awareness would help. 9  In fact, the record showed consumer education to be aneffective means of strengthening the company-specific option.  See DNC-Tr. at 212. (P.A. 0604)Lack of Enforcement  The repeated references to the government’s “enforcementexperience” are curious, since no such experience exists.  In the ten years that only company-specific “do-not-call” rules were in effect, the FCC issued only one published decision (andno forfeitures or even notices of apparent liability) that involved a violation, and in that lonecase it found only two calls that contravened a do-not-call request.  See Consumer.Net v.AT&T Corp., 15 FCC Rcd. 281, 288-89, 295-99 (1999).  Similarly, internal FTC documentsreveal zero cases alleging violations of its company-specific “do-not-call” rules. 10  The FTC’slack of activity is explained by its exclusive focus on fraud instead of “do-not-call” issues.  Seesupra at 3-4.  This absence of enforcement is significant, since the record before the FTCindicates that its enforcement actions generally reduce the problem addressed. 11  Lacking actual enforcement experience on “do-not-call,” the agencies pointed to thenumber of complaints they received about telemarketing issues generally.  For example, theFCC claimed it needed to review its TCPA rules in part because it received “over 11,000complaints” in two years.  FCC NPRM at 17466.  However, both agencies acknowledge suchcomplaint data is of doubtful relevance.  The FCC regularly points out in its quarterlystatistical reports about complaints, including TCPA complaints, that “many … do notinvolve violations” and “existence of a complaint does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing.”E.g., Report on Informal Consumer Inquiries and Complaints, 2nd Quarter Calendar Year 2003 (CGBSept. 12, 2003).  The FTC acknowledges that “[w]e do not know … from our complaintsanything other than the fact that we have received complaints.”  DNC-Tr. at 99-100. (P.A.0578-79)At the conclusion of its rulemaking, the FCC admitted “that the increasing number ofinquiries and complaints about telemarketing practices should not form the basis upon whichwe revise or adopt new rules under the TCPA.”  FCC Order at 14140.  Compare Gov. Br. 46,48 (asserting complaint data is sufficient to demonstrate problem).  The FCC had to makethis admission after ATA obtained access to a portion of the complaints through a FOIArequest, the review of which demonstrated the data failed to support the government’s initial
12  The FCC denied ATA’s request to make the complaints available as part of the record.  ATAthen requested them through FOIA, but the agency stalled production and imposed exorbitant fees.ATA ultimately obtained 2420 (or 22%) of the complaints, FCC Order at 14139-40 & n.785, andchallenged the FCC’s stonewalling in court. (P.A. 0429-0561) (complaint in American Teleservices Ass’n v.FCC, No. 03-1848 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 4, 2003)).13  See DNC-Tr. at 215 (P.A. 0604a) (“one of the things we’ve identified … is that we don’t reallyknow what the magnitude of the problem is and what the source … is”).  See also June 2002 Tr. at 206(P.A. 0626) (State of Missouri testimony indicating about 40 percent of the complaints received were“false positives,” including complaints directed toward exempt organizations and other irregularities);ATA comments at 70 n.80 (P.A. 0121) (citing evidence from Idaho Attorney General that “half of thecomplaints received in that office under the Idaho ‘do-not-call’ law since May 2, 2001 [were] fromexempt entities”); DNC-Tr. at 133 (P.A. 0589) (“the rule could be very effective and you wouldn’tnecessarily know it if you’re getting complaints [about] industry segments that are not within the rule”).14  ATA comments at 73-74 & Exh. 12. (P.A. 0124-25, 0341)  Another 9.5 percent of respondentswere not certain whether calls continued after they made the request.  Id. 15  See RR-Tr. at 7 (P.A. 0639) (NCL acknowledgement that “the telemarketing rule works, it workspretty well”); Brass-RR at 1 (P.A. 0339) (“I have found that the [TSR] works very well for me.  Severalmonths ago I was receiving 6 or 7 unwelcome calls per week.  Then I found out about the ‘Do-Not-Call’lists[.]  I began [using them and] I have not received a telemarketing call for quite some time.”).  Othersfound that “in most instances, when we ask … we receive no further phone calls”  Hickman-RR at 1.(P.A. 0341)  Another noted that most telemarketers calling his home “follow the rules.”  Bennett-RRat 1. (P.A. 0340)16  DNC-Tr. at 104 (P.A. 0583) (“looking at some of those complaints” and “from … experience,”“repeat calls after asking to be put on the do-not-call list are coming from entities … not subject” tothe company-specific rules.).  See also Know Your Caller Hearing at 28 (P.A. 0677) (FTC staff testimony that“it is the parties who are exempt that keep calling”).9
claims.12  Of complaints ATA was able to obtain, nearly two-thirds had nothing to do with“do-not-call” issues.  ATA Comments at 89-90 & Exh. 16. (P.A. 0140-41, 0234-38)  Theagencies’ inability to draw any conclusions based on complaint data is reinforced by recordevidence showing “do-not-call” complainants tend to focus on calls not subject to the rules,from both commercial and noncommercial sources. 13The Company-Specific Rules Work.  The record showed the company-specificoption effectively minimized unwanted calls when the rules were understood and used.Indeed, the FTC confirmed this conclusion by adopting the company-specific approach fortelemarketing by for-profit call centers on behalf of nonprofit organizations.  FTC Order at4637.  A survey of 1,000 consumers submitted to the FCC showed that, while only aboutone-third of respondents knew to ask to be on a telemarketer’s “do-not-call” list, almosttwo-thirds who did so reported the requests stopped unwanted calls. 14  Similar evidence waspresented to the FTC. 15  Moreover, the FTC staff members repeatedly acknowledged thatnoncompliance with the company-specific “do-not-call” requirement generally came fromentities that were exempt from the rules. 16Identified Problems Were Addressed.  The government asserts the company-specific approach is flawed because, among other things, dead-air calls and premature hang-ups preclude “do-not-call” requests, inability to identify callers undermines requests and
17  With approximately 275 million telephone “lines” nationwide (based on residential and wirelessnumbers that may be placed on the registry), this figure suggests Americans receive, on average, 2.64telemarketing calls per week.  But the FCC indicated (in a footnote) that the total number is substantiallylower because 41 percent of the 104 million are not completed (e.g., busy signals, no answer, oranswering machines).  FCC Order at 14021 n.28.18  An officer of Private Citizen submitted a log of the telemarketing calls he received over a threeyear period from all sources, including commercial, political and charitable sources.  The total amountedto 1.6 calls per week, which he described as an “epidemic” of calls.  ATA Reply Comments at 6 & n.11(P.A. 0258); Letter from Ronald London, Counsel for ATA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC,March 5, 2003. (P.A. 0760) 10
hinders identification of violators, and consumers cannot verify they have been placed on a“do-not-call” list.  See, e.g., Gov’t Br. 10, 12 n.5, 28.  Each of these alleged shortcomings wasaddressed by the agencies through other less restrictive rules.  For example, FTC and FCCpredictive dialer rules require telemarketers to “abandon” no more than three percent of allcalls, and even in that small percentage of cases to play a recording to identify thetelemarketer and provide its telephone number.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(4); 47 C.F.R.§ 64.1200(a)(6).  In addition, all telemarketers must pass through caller ID information(telephone number and, where possible, company name).  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(7); 47 C.F.R.§ 64.1601(e).  Now, irrespective of the registry rules, virtually all consumers will connect to alive sales agent with whom they can lodge a company-specific request.  See, e.g., FTC Order at4625; FCC Order at 14121; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(6).  New rules also prohibit interfering withthe ability to make “do-not-call” requests.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii).  The FCC also nowrequires telemarketers to honor company-specific “do-not-call” requests as quickly astechnically possible, and in all cases within 30 days.  FCC Order at 14069; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3).The industry recommended additional steps that could have bolstered the company-specific rules but were rebuffed by the agencies.  E.g., FCC Order at 14068; DNC-Tr. at 200,224. (P.A. 0601, 0605)  These included requiring telemarketers to offer toll-free numbers orwebsites for registering and/or confirming company-specific “do-not-call” requests.  FCCOrder at 14068.  Cf. DNC-Tr. at 28 (P.A. 0572) (AARP testimony requesting that “it [be]easier for people to get on a do-not-call list”).  Commenters also suggested affordingconsumers other ways to confirm company-specific requests were processed.  DNC-Tr. at201. (P.A. 0602)Call Volume.  Record findings regarding the growing number of telemarketing callswere presented without any sense of proportion or context, and do not demonstrate thatregulatory measures less restrictive than  the DNCR will fail.  E.g., Gov’t Br. 5.  Thegovernment merely states that  “as many as 104 million calls [are placed] a day – a five-foldincrease in the last decade” without also considering other factors.  Id. (citing, inter alia, FCCOrder at 14054).  But this number is a meaningless statistic to the extent it does not alsodisclose the proportional increase during this period with respect to telephone lines or callsactually received. 17  Information submitted by consumer advocates indicated consumersreceive only a handful of telemarketing calls, perhaps even less than two per week onaverage. 18  At the same time, nothing in the record indicated how many or what percentagecome from entities the government ultimately exempted from the registry, or the relativegrowth of the exempt and non-exempt categories of calls.  E.g., Gov. Br. 35 (“record doesnot contain evidence of the precise percentage of telemarketing calls that the registry would eliminate”).
19  FTC Order at 4593 (citing Michael A. Turner, Consumers, Citizens, Charity and Content: AttitudesToward Teleservices (Information Policy Institute, June 4, 2002)).  The study also found 40 percent ofrespondents would support rules that allow national companies to call if there is an established businessrelationship.20  DNC-Tr. at 154, 185 (P.A. 0591, 0597) (testimony of Private Citizen); id. at 91 (P.A. 0575)(NARUC testimony).21  FTC Order at 4626, 4628-29, 4646 (citing, e.g., Menefee-RR at 1 (P.A. 0342) (“I have … askedrepeatedly for one (non-Profit [telemarketer]) to stop soliciting money from me on the phone.  But atleast once or twice a year they call again.”); Peters-RR at 1 (P.A. 0343) (“telemarketing calls come fromcompanies, including some from our favored charities, that we have repeatedly and consistently askedto drop our names from their calling lists”)). 22  FCC Order at 14030, 14033, 14055 (citing, e.g., Hathaway at 1 (P.A. 0336) (“I do not want callseven from charities which I may support [or] calls from political parties even if they are the party I votefor.”); Reichenbach at 1 (P.A. 0337) (“When you begin the national DNC list, please do not allow anexception for non-profits”); Gagnon at 1 (P.A. 0338) (“Automated calls promoting politicalcandidates … should also be banned.”)). 11
“Fundamental Differences”.  The government’s claim that differential treatment ofcommercial and noncommercial callers rests on findings of “fundamental differences”between different categories of telemarketers has grown in importance during the litigationas a linchpin of the government’s justification of the DNCR scheme.  But nothing in therecord supports this claim.  Quite to the contrary, the FTC concluded specifically that“consumers are disturbed by unwanted calls regardless of whether the caller is seeking tomake a sale or to ask for a charitable contribution.”  FTC Order at 4637.  The FCC similarlyhas said there is no evidence to show “subscribers would find an advertising message moreoffensive than a request for a charitable contribution or a political message or solicitation.”FCC NOI Order, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1035.  See also TCPA Report and Order at 8773.The record confirms the Supreme Court’s insight that a “consumer’s interest in thefree flow of commercial information … may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interestin the day’s most urgent political debate.”  Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia CitizensConsumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).  Whether a particular telemarketing call maybe “unwanted” or “expected” does not turn on whether the call was commercial ornoncommercial, but on whether its subject interests the recipient.  In particular, the FTCcited a study by the Information Policy Institute which found 50 percent of consumerssupported regulations that would allow local or community-based organizations orbusinesses to call during specific hours. 19  Yet the rules adopted do not reflect these morenuanced preferences, and instead established broad categories of favored and disfavored callers.There was no finding that calls from commercial entities have a different impact onprivacy than calls from political or noncommercial sources.  Rather, testimony before theFTC and comments filed with both agencies showed that consumer reactions are largely thesame regardless of the identity of the caller or the subject of the call. 20    The administrativerecords were rife with comments indicating that noncommercial calls are no more welcomethan commercial calls, as is apparent even from just the relative handful the agenciesthemselves cited to support the national registry.  This was the case before both the FTC, 21and the FCC. 22  Survey research submitted in the FCC proceeding confirmed that a full 84
23   This claim is based entirely on a single comment in the FTC proceeding and is not backed byany evidence whatsoever.  See FTC Order at 4637.24  The TPS list, which The DMA has operated since 1985, at the time of the rulemaking included4.5 million consumers whom DMA members are required to refrain from calling under threat ofexpulsion.  DMA Comments at 7. (P.A. 0354) 12
percent of respondents found “calls from political candidates or promoting a political issue”either less acceptable than (42.9 percent) or no different from (41.1 percent) otherunsolicited calls, and that 81 percent considered calls for charitable contributions either lessacceptable or no different from other calls.  See ATA comments at 71-72 & Exh. 12. (P.A.0122-23, 0222-28)Nor did the record provide any basis for the government’s current assertion thattelemarketers who call on behalf of charities are “less likely to engage in abusivetelemarketing practices that might alienate the customer.” 23  Although the governmentclaims noncommercial solicitors have “different incentives” than commercial telemarketers,and that charitable solicitors may be more receptive to company-specific rules (because“some … had already set up their own ‘do-not-call’ lists”), Gov. Br. 49, these factors hardlydistinguish commercial from noncommercial telemarketers.  Like noncommercial entities,the record showed commercial callers have the same incentive to avoid alienatingprospective customers.  E.g., ATA Comments at 42, 88, 102, 111 & Exh. 3; DMAComments, Exh. A at 8 (P.A. 0093, 0139, 0153, 0162, 0180-88, 0146)  Moreover,establishment of voluntary “do-not-call” lists does not does not set noncommercial entitiesapart – DMA established the TPS, and many commercial telemarketers initiated individual“do-not-call” lists. 24  Indeed, when it first established company-specific rules, the FCC noted“[s]uch lists are already maintained on a voluntary basis by many telemarketers.”  TCPAReport and Order at 8773. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTBecause the government assumed incorrectly that some speakers “have rights thatothers don’t” it misunderstood the delicate constitutional balancing that is required forregulations designed to protect people from exposure to unwanted speech.  Petitioners havenever disputed the government’s ability to adopt appropriately tailored regulation.  But thecontrolling principles – for both commercial and noncommercial speakers – are that anylimitations be both narrow and neutral.  This is the central theme of the Supreme Court’sdecision in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), which held that thegovernment cannot impose discriminatory regulations on commercial speech that bear norelationship to the governmental interest at issue.  Here, the differential regulations imposedby the DNCR violate these principles, since a ringing phone at dinnertime has the sameeffect on privacy, regardless of the identity of the caller or the subject of the call.The DNCR is not comparable to the company-specific “do-not-mail” regulation theSupreme Court upheld in Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).  Quite to the contrary,Rowan supports the Petitioners in this case because it approved the use of a measure that inall important respects is identical to the less restrictive company-specific “do-not-call”approach.  The Court held that the postal regulations were constitutional because that lawgave the individual recipient complete discretion and denied the government anydiscretionary authority to determine what mail should be blocked, leaving the decisionentirely in the hands of the homeowner.  Even though the law was designed only to block“sexually provocative” mail, the Court in Rowan said that it was solely a matter for the
13
individual to judge, and that the homeowner could use the provision to stop the mailing of a“dry goods catalog” if that was his preference.  Here, by contrast, the DNCR isunconstitutional because government decides which calls to block and which calls to permitwhen a homeowner decides to list his number on the national registry.  Additionally, itsInternet sign-up feature lacks verification and thus allows third parties to register householdson the DNCR without their knowledge or approval.The DNCR also fails the Central Hudson test governing the regulation of commercialspeech.  The government failed to meet its burden to prove that the rule will materiallyadvance its asserted goals.  The registry has numerous exemptions and exclusions and thegovernment made no effort beyond guesswork to determine what proportion of calls wouldbe blocked for those who sign up.  Nor did it seek to determine whether the calls that arestopped by the DNCR correspond to individual preferences.  The record in this proceedingis far more nuanced, and suggests that the registry is significantly under- and over-inclusive.Data from the TCPA legislative history and from the current record not only fail to supportthe government’s assumptions, but undermine them.The DNCR also is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored.  Faced withevidence that the registry would devastate the teleservices industry, the FTC and FCCbrushed these serious concerns aside and failed to weigh them.  Bent on implementing theFTC’s announced intention to impose a DNCR, they overlooked and failed to build a recordjustifying their rejection of effective, less restrictive alternatives in violation of U S West v.FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2001).  The most obvious of these was educating consumersabout, and beginning to enforce, preexisting company-specific “do-not-call” rules, which theagencies concluded could be effective for certain callers.  The record was clear that therewas widespread public ignorance of the rules, and that neither the FTC nor FCC had everenforced them.  Additionally, the agencies did not consider the impact of the less restrictiverules they adopted in addressing perceived inadequacies of the company-specific approach,and they failed to adopt other such measures proposed by commenters.  Finally, thegovernment failed to consider market-based solutions that have emerged since the TCPAwas adopted. ARGUMENT
25  Remarks of Chairman Timothy J. Muris, FTC Press Conference, Dec. 18, 2002.  See Ans. ¶ 62(admitting Muris statement).  Compare George Orwell, ANIMAL FARM 123 (1946) (“some animals aremore equal than others”).26  See FTC Order at 4635-36 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) andPosadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).27  Any suggestion that “the Government’s interest in suppressing speech becomes more weightyas popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment.”  United States v. Eichman,496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (“national consensus” cannot justify restriction on speech).  See United Statesv. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818, 826 (2000) (government cannot restrict speech “even withthe mandate or approval of a majority”).  Compare Gov. Br. 35 (asserting “the popularity of thegovernment’s program” justifies it). 14
I. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO IMPLEMENT BALANCEDRULES AS BOTH THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE TCPA REQUIREThe government through the DNCR has engineered a selective ban based on itsestimation of the relative value of various types of speech.  However, First Amendmentrights cannot be “balanced” by preserving some speakers’ rights while extinguishing others,particularly where neither the FTC nor the FCC examined or tried to implement actualconsumer preferences regarding which calls to block and which to permit, and did notexamine their relative impact on privacy.    A. The Government’s Limited Constitutional Analysis isDeeply Flawed Because of its Preoccupation WithCommercial Versus Noncommercial SpeechFrom the beginning, clear thinking about the constitutional issues in this case hasbeen obscured by Chairman Muris’ unfortunate claim that “charities and religions have FirstAmendment rights that others don’t have.” 25  The same goes for politicians, the regulationof whose calls Chairman Muris simply remarked is “above my pay grade.”  The FTC andFCC assume they have greater latitude to restrict some forms of commercial telemarketingbecause telemarketers are unpopular and because commercial speech sometimes may beregulated more intensively than other expression. 26  It is from this faulty premise that manyof the government’s constitutional errors flow. 27 Petitioners have never disputed residential privacy as an interest that can besupported by appropriately-tailored regulation.  But the categorical claim that “theindividual’s right to be left alone [in the privacy of his home] plainly outweighs the FirstAmendment rights of an intruder,” Gov. Br. 31 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-749 (1978)), fails to account for the careful balancing that is required when FirstAmendment and privacy interests must be accommodated.  This Court has examined the“difficulties encountered in this age of exploding information, when rights bestowed by theUnited States Constitution must be guarded as vigilantly as in the days of handbills on public
28  E.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815 (cable television permits individualized blocking); SableCommunications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-131 (1989) (telephone technology permitsindividualized blocking).
29  ATA Comments at 56-58, 89-92 & Exhs. 14-15 (P.A. 0107-09, 0140-43, 0229-33) (listingtechnical options).  Such developments are germane to whether the rules under review constitute a“reasonable fit.”  See infra Section II.B.3.b. 15
sidewalks.”  U S WEST, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1999).  It has cautionedin the commercial speech context that “[i]n the name of deference to agency action,important civil liberties, such as the First Amendment’s protection of speech, could easily beoverlooked.”  Id.  Here, it appears the agencies are hoping the Court will overlook these vitalissues as did the FCC in U S West.It is important to recognize, as is written into the TCPA, that “pitting the FirstAmendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights of those who may be unwillingviewers or auditors … demand[s] delicate balancing.”  Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422U.S. 205, 208 (1975).  Thus, despite the seemingly absolute language cited by the government(e.g., “no one has the right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient,” Gov. Br. 32-33 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000))), courts uniformly have permitted onlyvery narrow restrictions on speech in this area, both in the noncommercial and commercialspeech contexts.  For example, in Hill, the Court approved only limited restrictions on“sidewalk counselling” outside abortion clinics that had no “adverse impact on the readers’ability to read signs displayed by demonstrators,” and did not preclude communication at a“normal conversational distance.”  530 U.S. at 714, 726-727.  Similarly, in Frisby v. Schultz,487 U.S. 474 (1988), the Supreme Court held a restriction on targeted residential picketingmust be narrowly tailored to permit picketers to disseminate their messages generallythrough residential neighborhoods, including “go[ing] door-to-door to proselytize theirviews” or “contact[ing] residents by telephone, short of harassment.”  Id. at 483-484.  On the question of balance, the government’s reliance on Pacifica relates directly tothe factors prescribed in the TCPA, although not in the way the government intended.  SeeGov. Br. 31.  Even in the case of “indecent” broadcasts that may intrude into the home, theCourt held that any restrictions must be narrow.  The “time channeling” approved in thatcase applies only during a time of day when children are likely to be in the audience, Action forChildren’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying sameintermediate scrutiny as in commercial speech cases), and cannot be applied at all tononbroadcast media that permit homeowners to make individualized blocking decisions. 28Notably, the TCPA was predicated on the understanding that no such individualizedblocking solutions existed to address concerns over telemarketing, Pub. L. No. 102-243,§ 2(11), 105 Stat. 2394 (1991), but since its passage a range of technical alternatives haveevolved that give individuals a great deal of choice about the nature and volume of calls theyreceive from all outside sources. 29The required balancing is no different in cases involving commercial speech.  Thus, inBolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Supreme Court struck down arestriction on the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements designed “to protectthose recipients who might potentially be offended.”  Id. at 72 (distinguishing Rowan because
30  Dictum in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150(2002), is not to the contrary.  See State Br. 15.  That case struck down a requirement that individualswishing to engage in door-to-door advocacy must obtain a solicitation permit and display their nameswhile soliciting.  Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 165-69.  The Court did not address a “do-not-solicit” provisionthat “establishe[d] a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits.”Unlike the DNCR, the ordinance did not dictate which solicitors to ban but instead allowedhomeowners to choose from nineteen separate categories of solicitors – including both commercial andnoncommercial  speakers – they might block or permit.  Id. at 157.  31  E.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 723 (upholding restriction on “sidewalk counselling” because it“applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists andmissionaries”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 795 (1989) (regulation of soundamplification to protect nearby residents denies government ability “to vary the sound qualityor volume based on the message being delivered”); Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428(“prohibition against the use of sound trucks emitting loud and raucous’ noise in residentialneighborhoods is permissible if it applies equally to music, political speech and advertising.”)(emphasis added). 16
the mail blocked by the postal rule was in “sole discretion” of homeowner).  Whererestrictions on commercial speech are permitted to protect privacy, they must be narrow.  InFlorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court upheld a 30-day moratorium ondirect-mail solicitation by attorneys to accident victims, a distinctly vulnerable class.  The 5-4decision was predicated on the majority’s finding that the restriction was “narrow both inscope and duration” and on the ability to communicate using the same medium, i.e.,non-directed mail, during the moratorium.  Id. at 635 (emphasis added).  See Revo v.Disciplinary Bd., 106 F.3d 929, 935 (10th Cir. 1997).At bottom, the government’s ability to shield “unwilling listeners” is the sameregardless whether speech is commercial or core political speech. 30  In either case,regulations intended to protect privacy interests must be both narrow and neutral. 31  Thispoint was again illustrated in Action for Children’s Television where the D.C. Circuit struck downa preferential “safe harbor” that barred commercial broadcasters from broadcasting“indecent” programs during the same hours when noncommercial broadcasters wereunrestricted.  58 F.3d at 668-669 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410(1993)).  The decision was a straightforward application of the “bedrock principle” that thegovernment cannot “impose[ ] different restrictions on each of two categories of [speakers]while failing to explain how this disparate treatment advance[s] its goal.”  Id. at 669.This, of course, is the core holding of Discovery Network, which invalidated a localregulation premised solely on a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.The Court articulated two general principles that apply fully here: (1) a distinction betweencommercial and noncommercial speech that “bears no relationship whatsoever to theparticular interests that the city has asserted” is invalid, and (2) a restriction thatoveremphasizes the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech “seriouslyunderestimates the value of commercial speech.”  507 U.S. at 424.  Subsequent casesapplying Discovery Network have made clear “it is unconstitutional to ban commercial speechbut not non-commercial speech – at least absent a showing that the commercial speech hasworse secondary effects.”  Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1074 n.54 (3d Cir. 1994).See also Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 1998).
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The government erroneously tries to limit the relevance of Discovery Network to theanalysis of Central Hudson’s “material advancement” requirement which is discussed below.See infra Section II.B.2.  But this ignores Discovery Network’s principal rationale – that adistinction between commercial and noncommercial speakers cannot be upheld if it bears“no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted.”  Id. at 424(emphasis in original).  The Court explained that “the principal reason for drawing adistinction between commercial and noncommercial speech has little, if any, application to aregulation of their distribution,” id. at 426 n.21, and questioned whether the commercialspeech doctrine was appropriate in such cases.  Id. at 416 n.11.  Here, the record makes clearthe DNCR suffers from the same infirmity as the Cincinnati ordinance in Discovery Networkbecause of its unjustified distinctions among speakers.  As noted above, there is no substanceto the government’s claim of “fundamental differences” between commercial andnoncommercial.  Compare supra at 15-18 with Gov. Br. 46-50.  See also infra at 38-41.B. The DNCR Violates the First Amendment Because itImposes the Government’s Speech Preferences, Not the Individual’sThe district court correctly found that the DNCR “is a significant enoughgovernmental intrusion and burden on commercial speech to amount to a governmentrestriction implicating the First Amendment.”  Mainstream Marketing, 2003 WL 22213517 at*10.  The response that a “decision to place a number on the registry is voluntary,” and “akinto a ‘NO SOLICITORS’ sign whereby consumers may indicate that they do not want anyfurther unsolicited commercial telemarketing calls,” Gov. Br. 11, 21 (caps in original), isinapt because it overlooks the government’s role in defining which callers are restricted.Consumers may choose whether to place numbers on the DNCR, but the government decideswhich callers – both commercial and noncommercial – are blocked by the law.The rules’ odd collection of coverages and exemptions is far from a simple “nosolicitation” sign.  Political solicitations are never covered by the law, while charitable orreligious organizations may (or may not) be subject to a company-specific “do-not-call”requirement depending on who places the call, even if they call about the same cause and useidentical scripts.  The same is true for businesses – exempt and non-exempt companies aretreated differently even when they are competing directly against each other in marketing thesame or similar products.  See CompTel Br. 3-6.The DNCR cannot legitimately be compared to the postal regulations in Rowan v. PostOffice, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), because the government has chosen which calls will be blocked whenconsumer names are placed on the DNCR.  In fact, Rowan supports Petitioners, not thegovernment, as the law upheld there operates almost exactly like the company-specificrequirements elsewhere in the final rules.  At issue in Rowan was a company-specific opt-outrequirement “intended to allow the addressee complete and unfettered discretion in electingwhether … he desired … further material from a particular sender.”  397 U.S. at 734.  Here,by imposing the DNCR requirement (on top of company-specific rules), the governmentchose a very different approach.  See Mainstream Marketing, 2003 WL 22213517 at *10(“mechanism purportedly created by the FTC to effectuate consumer choice insteadinfluences consumer choice”).  In Rowan, the Court relied heavily upon the fact that thepostal statute was amended by the House in order “to remove ‘the right of the Government
32  Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.  Moreover, the statute in Rowan hinged upon the Postmaster Generalreceiving an opt-out notice “from the addressee,” id. at 730, and thus truly involved opt-out decisionsby the mail recipient.  By contrast, the DNCR allows individuals to register anonymously over theInternet many phone numbers at one time.  FTC Order at 4639.  This has already resulted in individualsbeing placed on the DNCR by third parties without their knowledge or approval.  Valentine & KennellyAffidavits.  (P.A. 0734-59)33  Gov. Br. 40-42.  Rowan was decided in 1970, well before the Supreme Court extended FirstAmendment protection to commercial speech.  See Virginia Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia. Citizens ConsumerCouncil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  If the commercial nature of the mailings had been dispositive, theCourt simply would have found no First Amendment issue since such material was unprotected at thetime.  34  The FCC has taken the position that candidate advertisements by Larry Flynt could beconsidered obscene and therefore exempt from “reasonable access” requirements under theCommunications Act.  See Letter from Chairman Mark Fowler to Congressman Thomas A. Luken, (Jan.19, 1984) (described in Harvey Zuckman, et. al, 3 MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 186 (West Group1999).  See also Reuters, Porn Candidate Mary Carey Buys Ad Time on Leno, Oct. 3, 2003 (P.A. 0719).
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to involve itself in any determination of the content and nature of these objectionablematerials,’” thus removing all discretion from the government.  397 U.S. at 733.  Moreover,the Court concluded that “Congress provided this sweeping power [to allow homeowners torequest prohibitory orders to block unsolicited erotic mail] not only to protect privacy but toavoid possible constitutional questions that might arise from vesting the power to make anydiscretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental official.” 32  Thus, the purportedly “voluntary” nature of the registry does not avoid constitutionalproblems where the government controls the speakers to whom the restrictions apply.Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), struck down a ban on door-to-door solicitationbecause it “substitute[d] the judgment of the community for the judgment of the individualhouseholder.”  Id. at 144.  While the Court indicated that homeowners instead could erect“no solicitation” signs, the ordinance would have fared no better if it permitted residentsonly to erect “no solicitation” signs that selectively barred speakers disfavored by the towncouncil.  Ultimately, constitutional protection is based on the principle that “the speaker andthe audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented.”  Edenfield v.Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).  For precisely this reason, Pearson rejected a similar attempt toexpand Rowan to a discriminatory opt-out, pointing out that “[i]n Rowan, a homeowner couldprevent any material from entering his home.”  153 F.3d at 404 (citing 397 U.S. at 737).  The government confuses the constitutional question presented in Rowan and tries toframe it as a commercial speech case, which it clearly is not. 33  It observes the postalregulation applies only to “advertisements,” but that says nothing about whether thecommunication involved would be considered commercial speech in a constitutional sense.See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (editorial advertisement is politicalspeech).  As the government is well aware, advertisements by political candidates may wellrun afoul of the restrictions on “erotically arousing or sexually provocative” materials. 34Indeed, the sole case the government cites for its claim that the postal regulation restrictsonly “commercial” matter proves just the opposite point.  The court in United States PostalService v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1986), held only that the rulescould not be used to block the sending of Hustler magazine to members of Congress in theiroffices because it would interfere with the right to petition the government.  But the court
35  Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 871 (“In the home a Member can invoke the special privileges as ahouseholder, including the privilege of stopping undesirable mail under § 3008.”).   36  Petitioners do not concede the DNCR’s discriminatory restrictions warrant less than strictscrutiny, Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11, but they are invalid even under the standard typicallyapplied in commercial speech cases. 19
observed that the postal regulation could be used to block such politically-motivated mailingsto the residences of congressmen, just as it could be used by other homeowners. 35  Withrespect to congressional offices, however, the court held that the requested prohibitory orderbarring the mailing of Hustler magazine was unconstitutional because it was “rooted incontent discrimination.”  Id. at 871.As with the rest of its constitutional argument, the government here tries to make fartoo much of the fact that its rules target commercial speech.  But it cannot explain how theDNCR, which expressly dictates which calls are blocked and which ones get through, can becompared to a post office rule in which “the power of the householder … is unlimited; hemay prohibit the mailing of a dry goods catalog because he objects to the contents.”  Rowan,397 U.S. at 737.  Senate Amici, in a brief prepared by Dean Rodney Smolla, contend “therewas content-based regulation in Rowan,” and that the district court here “appeareddisproportionately influenced by … Discovery Network.”  Senate Br. 15, 17 (emphasis original).Perhaps the best answer to this argument was put forward by Dean Smolla himself, when hetestified just one month ago to the Senate Commerce Committee that the DNCR appears tobe “in tension with current First Amendment doctrines, especially decisions such as DiscoveryNetwork.”  He concluded the best way to ensure that “do-not-call” rules are constitutional “isto pattern the registry after the postal rules upheld in Rowan, permitting consumers to blockall unsolicited calls, from whatever source.” (P.A. 0732)  Indeed.II. THE DNCR IS UNCONSTITUTIONALThe government fails to meet its burden of proof under Central Hudson Gas & Elec.Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 36  As a threshold matter, Central Hudsonanalysis asks whether a regulation involves truthful speech and legal activity.  If so, theregulation may be upheld only if it (1) is needed to serve an important governmental interest;(2) directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) is narrowly tailored to restrict nomore speech than necessary.  Id. at 564-565.  It is the government’s burden to build a record“adequate to clearly articulate and justify” any limitation.  Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v.Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1069 (10th Cir. 2001) (“ULBA”) (quoting U S West, 182 F.3d at1234).  In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has made clear it will not uphold restrictionson commercial speech backed only by “unsupported assertions,” Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus.& Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 143 (1994), or even “anecdotal evidence and educated guesses.”Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490 (1995).  See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517U.S. 484, 505 (1996).
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A. This Case Involves Truthful Speech About LawfulProducts and ServicesThis case is solely about regulating honest businesses.  There is no claim that thetelemarketing activities addressed by the DNCR involve misleading speech or unlawfulactivities.  See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416.  Yet the government and supporting amiciinexplicably cite legislative history of the Telemarketing Act, with its focus on “[i]nterstatetelemarketing fraud,” as justification for the DNCR.  Gov. Br. 8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6101);House Br. 9-10, 13-15; AARP Br. 1-16.  However, the Telemarketing Act related almostentirely to issues of fraud, while the TCPA was premised on recognizing “the legitimacy oftelemarketing industry.”  See First TCPA Order at 8753; U.S. Security v. FTC, 2003 WL22203719 *5 (Congress was not contemplating “do-not-call” issues with the TelemarketingAct).  The government’s lack of precision in framing the issues has spawned confusion aboutthe nature of the interests involved.  For example, this Court referred to the legislativehistory of the Telemarketing Act and congressional findings regarding fraudulent activity.FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003).  But fraud issues arethe subject of entirely different rules having nothing to do with “do-not-call” or theoverwhelming majority of the teleservices industry.  See supra at 3-4, 11 & n.1 (congressionalstatements).  The FTC in the past has drawn a sharp distinction between the two.  Id.Accordingly, this Court must focus on the remaining elements of the Central Hudson test.
37  The two cases cited for this proposition involved content-neutral regulation of automatic dialingmachines, not “do-not-call” regulations.  See Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir 1995);Minnesota v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W. 2d 882 (Minn. 1992).  21
B. The DNCR Fails Ce n tra l H u d s o n  1. The Government Failed to Demonstrate aSubstantial Need for the DNCR.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................The government’s interest in residential privacy as a general proposition has never been disputed   Butas this Court cautioned, “the government cannot satisfy” Central Hudson “by merely assertinga broad interest in privacy,” U S West, 182 F.3d at 1234-35, so it cannot demonstrate itsinterest by merely naming an activity that may impinge upon privacy.  It must demonstrateits interest in the particular regulations it proposes to adopt.  It is worth noting, then, thatthis case does not involve attempts to intimidate individuals seeking medical treatment, Gov.Br. 25 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-717), wiretapping, id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)), or people held captive by targeted picketing.Id. at 32 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485).  Rather, description of the government’s interest asenabling consumers to block calls that are “intrusive” because they demand “immediateattention,” Gov. Br. 32, underscores that it chose a content-based solution to address acontent-neutral problem. 37  .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................The same interest applies whether calls are made either by covered entities or by exempt entities underthe DNCR.  As the Eighth Circuit explained in Van Bergen, the identical concern arises frompolitical calls to the same degree as commercial calls.  The interest was substantial, accordingto the court, “because the recipient [of an automated call] has no opportunity to indicate thedesire to receive such calls.”  59 F.3d at 1555.  On this basis it upheld rules that give “therecipient … the opportunity to tell the operator, at any point in the conversation, that he
38  Playboy Entmt. Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 786 (D. Del. 1996).   On this basisthe court denied Playboy injunctive relief based on an initial finding that it was unlikely to prevail, id.at 790, but later ruled for Playboy on the merits.  See infra note 39.39  Playboy Entmt. Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp.2d 702, 713 (D. Del. 1998), aff’d, 529 U.S.803 (2000).  It is immaterial that Playboy was a strict scrutiny case while this is a Central Hudson case.Whether the government must show a “compelling” interest or merely an “important or substantial”interest, it nevertheless must demonstrate the harm is real and additional restrictions are needed toalleviate it.  Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-771.40  Playboy, 30 F.Supp.2d. at 712.  State amici inaccurately compare the less restrictive rule in Playboyto the DNCR because it permitted blocking by individual homeowners.  State Br. 28.  But the tworestrictions would be comparable only if the government had prescribed a list of channels not of theindividual’s choosing to be blocked upon homeowner request.  Such a rule was not at issue in Playboyand would never have been upheld in that case. 22
does not want to hear from the calling person or entity again.”  Id.  In short, the substantialinterest was sufficient to justify company-specific rules................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Here, the government fails to show a substantial interest in rules that go beyond a company-specificapproach and it seeks authority to dictate which categories of speech are blocked by theDNCR.  Similar issues arose in Playboy, where the three-judge district court had no difficultyfinding a compelling interest in the general proposition – protecting children from unwantedsexually-oriented images in the home 38 –  but nevertheless held the government failed tomeet its burden of demonstrating the law at issue was “necessary to serve a compellinginterest.” 39  The court found the government could not show existing regulations wereinadequate, and was particularly concerned about lack of public awareness of less restrictiveregulatory options (voluntary household-by-household blocking), explaining that “[i]f the[less restrictive] blocking option is not being promoted, it cannot become a meaningfulalternative.” 40  In affirming, the Supreme Court agreed the less restrictive but unpublicizedoption had not been given a “fighting chance.”  Playboy, 529 U.S. at 819.  Here, thegovernment may have shown a general interest in residential privacy, or even in adoptingcompany-specific rules, but it has failed to show a substantial need for the DNCR where
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there is widespread public ignorance about the company-specific rules and neither the FTCnor FCC has ever enforced them.2. The Government Failed to Prove the DNCRWill Materially Advance its InterestIt is the government’s burden to prove that its restriction on commercial speech will advance its goalsto a material degree.  Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-771.  This cannot be accomplished throughspeculation and conjecture or “conclusory assertion[s].”  ULBA , 256 F.3d at 1074.Numerous courts have held that “exemptions and inconsistencies bring into question [alaw’s] purpose,” thereby precluding it from directly and materially achieving its objectives.Rubin 514 U.S. at 489.  See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,189 (1999); ULBA , 256 F.3d at 1071-74.  Here, the government claims to have met itsburden by adopting a measure to lessen telemarketing calls by some unspecified amount.While acknowledging the registry “does not seek … to eliminate all [unsolicited] telephonecalls,” the government assumes each call it blocks serves its purpose of “reducing the numberof unwanted telephone solicitations.”  Gov. Br. 35 (emphasis in original).  But whether itchooses to characterize its purpose as limiting the aggregate number of calls or surgicallyexcising undesired communications, the government falls woefully short of meeting its burden.The government’s admission that “the record does not contain evidence as to theprecise percentage of telemarketing calls that the registry would eliminate” reveals a gift forunderstatement.  Id.  The FTC Order offers only the initial “guesstimate” that the registry willblock 40 to 60 percent of commercial telemarketing calls, FTC Order at 4634, while FCC didnot even do that.  As it turns out, however, neither agency had even the slightest support forits claims.  See Mainstream Mktg., 2003 WL 22213517 *4 n.1.  Pressed on this point below, the
41  In Edge, the district court and court of appeals invalidated a federal ban on the broadcast oflottery advertisements in states where lotteries were illegal.  They reasoned that the materialadvancement prong of Central Hudson was not met in barring a North Carolina station from carryinglottery ads where it accounted for only 11 percent of the listening time in its area of service, whereVirginia stations could air lottery ads.  24
FTC was unable to cite any data, analysis or other evidence to support its estimate of thepercentage of calls expected to be blocked (which by then had grown to 80 percent):THE COURT:  Where did you come up with this astonishing figurethat  you’re going to … affect 80 percent of these calls?MR. DeMILLE-WAGMAN:  Your Honor, we based that figure onthe estimation … that was made by direct marketing – by the ATA ofthe percentage of jobs that would be lost.THE COURT:  Really?Stay Tr. at 7. (P.A. 0007)  See also Gov. Br. 35 n.9 (acknowledging estimated reduction in callsrests on industry prediction of lost business).  This admission is stunningly ironic, since bothagencies dispute there will be any economic losses at all.  FCC Order at 14029; FTC Order at4631-32 (claiming rules will benefit telemarketers).The FTC ultimately conceded “there is no record in this case other than that figure,”based solely on potential job losses by the telemarketing industry, to support governmentclaims regarding the registry’s potential impact.  Stay Tr. at 8 (P.A. 0008) (emphasis added).The agency acknowledged “we cannot give … an exact percentage that will be blocked,” oreven a reasonable approximation. Id. at 9. (P.A. 0009)  The district court noted the estimate“has crescendoed through the course of this lawsuit and taken on a life of its own with noreference to the factual record.”  Mainstream Mktg., 2003 WL 22232209*3 n.1.  It concluded“[t]here is nothing whatsoever in the administrative record or the record before this court,beyond the FTC’s ipse dixit, to support this amalgam.”  Id.Lacking any factual support the government seeks refuge in a lax standard of review.It quotes United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993), for the proposition that itis not required to “make progress on every front before it can make progress on any front.”Gov. Br. 36, 38.  But see Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 194-95 (distinguishingEdge); News America Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 815 (D.C. Cir 1988) (“courts reject thefacile one-bite-at-a-time explanation for rules affecting important First Amendment values”).Extrapolating from Edge Broadcasting, the government assumes it satisfies Central Hudson if itcan reasonably presume to reduce telemarketing calls by at least 11 percent. 41  But this is ablatant misreading of Edge Broadcasting.  The Court quite clearly explained the lower courtshad “asked the wrong question” in focusing on the percentage of the audience affected, andthe proper inquiry was whether the federal law “support[ed] the anti-gambling policy of aState like North Carolina.”  Id. at 427-428.  Analyzed this way, the law by definition served itspurpose 100 percent of the time.The Court confirmed this reading of Edge in a subsequent case in which it confrontedthe same question at issue here – whether exemptions from a law designed to reduce theincidence of certain messages reaching their audience affect the Central Hudson inquiry.  In
42  Edge relied on Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), whichhas been effectively overruled.  44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.  See also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2, 489-91. 43  Gov. Br. 6, 7, 26, 46, 47, 48.  The same data is repeated in cases the government cites.  E.g.,Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003); Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d54 (9th Cir. 1995). 25
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 194-195 & n.8, the Court explained the regulationin Edge was upheld only because of the limited government interest of supporting the law innon-lottery states.  But where its purpose is reducing the total number of “undesirable”commercial communications – as it is here – exemptions from coverage are fatal underCentral Hudson.  Id. at 193-94.  See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489; ULBA , 256 F.3d at 1071-74.Additionally, Edge Broadcasting has been superceded by cases that tightened Central Hudson’s“substantial advancement” requirement,42 and was not followed by this Court in ULBA , 356F.3d at 1073-74.Failing to prove the aggregate reduction, the government asserts that eachcommercial call it blocks is unwanted because, after all, the consumer decided to list his orher number on the DNCR.  Gov. Br. 32, 35.  But this assumption is entirely unsupported.The FTC itself described the overbroad reach of the DNCR, which blocks all calls in a givencategory – including calls the consumer “would not mind receiving” – as distinguished froma company-specific approach that perfectly reflects individual preferences.  FTC Order at4636.  The record shows “consumers preferred a ‘nuanced approach’ to the ‘do-not-call’issue, wanting to limit some calls to their household, but not all calls.”  Id. at 4593.  TheDNCR’s content categories do not match these preferences, since individual choices are notdefined by commercial versus noncommercial considerations.  Consumers do not mindreceiving calls from certain businesses, id. at 4593 (citing IPI Study), while the FTC foundconsumers can be “disturbed by unwanted calls regardless of whether the caller is seeking tomake a sale or to ask for a charitable contribution.”  Id. at 4637.  The FCC had no datawhatsoever on the broad range of consumer preferences, since it cautioned commenters atthe outset not to submit information on political, charitable or religious telemarketing.  Seesupra note 6.Because the agencies collected no current data on this issue the government reliesexclusively on a 12-year-old reference in the TCPA legislative history for its conclusions thatcommercial calls cause the most problems and noncommercial calls are less intrusive becausethey are more “expected.” 43  The government’s repeated citation to this old data – at leastsix references in the current brief alone – highlights the poverty of the current record on thisissue.  There is no attempt to explain what makes a political or charitable call more“expected,” since “the imperious ring of the telephone” is the same regardless of thepurpose of the call.  The absence of any distinction is clearly illustrated by the current record.See supra notes 7, 16, 21-22.In any event, the government’s citation of the TCPA’s legislative history is highlymisleading.  It grossly distorts the data in the House Report to suggest that complaintsregarding commercial solicitations “ranged from 80 to 99 percent” when that informationwas drawn from only a handful of the states that had statistical information “readilyavailable.”  H. Rep. 102-317 at 16.  The government fails to disclose that up to half of the
44  House Br. 9-10, 13-15.  Compare supra at 3-5, 31-32 (discussing different objectives ofTelemarketing Act and TCPA).  The claim that “none of the … evidence before Congress identifiedsimilar problems by charitable telemarketers” is false.  See Brief for the United States and the FederalTrade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 123 S.Ct.1829 (2003), 2002 WL 31907178, at *8 (detailing examples of abuse and “misrepresentations … typicalof the charitable solicitation frauds that the federal government prosecutes both civilly and criminally”).45  Do Not Call List Authorization Hearing, Jan. 8, 2003 at 7.  See also id. at 32 (statement ofChairman Tauzin) (“I personally am offended by all the recorded calls from politicians … I know a lotof folks who are tired of hearing [these] messages”); id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Cox) (“there is no reasonto grant preferred status to political calls, which are often the most annoying of all”); id. at 4 (statementof Rep. Barton) (registry should include political and charitable calls); id. at 10-11 (statement of Rep.Terry) (listing less restrictive technical options that would be preferable to “kill[ing] an industry”); id. at30 (statement of Rep. Deal) (people will continue to get calls that bother them); id. at 34-35 (FTCresponse to Rep. Burr that it conducted no “studies or surveys” to determine which calls consumers findmost annoying). 26
complaints in other states mentioned in the House Report (including New York, Tennessee,Nevada, and Washington) related to charitable or political calls.  Id.  This remarkable findingundoubtedly understates the problem, since state telemarketing laws almost all exemptpolitical and charitable calls.  The current record also shows that states currently receive asubstantial number of complaints for calls from exempt categories.  See supra note 13.It is significant that the House Report data relates solely to complaints, since thegovernment has acknowledged “complaints about telemarketing practices should not formthe basis upon which we revise or adopt new rules under the TCPA.”  FCC Order at 14140.See supra at 11-12.  The House report data – now being presented as dispositive – did notpersuade Congress in 1991 to cut off further inquiry.  Instead, it directed the FCC tomonitor the issue, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D), acknowledging that charitable or political callscan “represent as serious a problem as commercial solicitations.”  H. Rep. 102-317 at 16-17.This is important because the TCPA delegated to the FCC the task of maintaining the properconstitutional balance.  But the government here abdicated its responsibility by intentionallyavoiding collection of updated information in this critical area.  See supra note 6.Consequently, the record compiled below fails to show the DNCR materially furthers its interest.The revisionist account of the legislative history in the House amicus brief fares nobetter in its attempt to pin the problem on commercial callers.  Much of the brief is devotedto discussion of fraud or abuse issues and legislative history of the Telemarketing Act that isboth irrelevant to this case and factually incorrect. 44  The quoted fragments of witnesstestimony and Member comments on “do-not-call” issues are highly misleading.  While thebrief cites 1991 testimony of Robert Bulmash of Private Citizen to suggest commercial callsare different from other categories, House Br. 7, it overlooks Mr. Bulmash’s statement to theFTC in 2000 that “when I’m called from the shower, when I’m called from dinner for asolicitation … I don’t care if it’s a nonprofit, a survey or a solicitation call.  I feel stronglythat a national do-not-call database should include the options of getting off sales, surveyand fundraising calls.”  DNC-Tr. 155. (P.A. 0592)  And while it quotes congressman Dingellfor the proposition that exempting charitable solicitations is “common sense,” it omits hisstatement that rules should “maximize consumer choice [by] allowing individuals to receivethe calls they want and to avoid those they do not,” as well as the statements of otherMembers indicating that exempt political and charitable calls are the most problematic. 45Notably, as Rep. Tauzin has pointed out with respect to exemptions, if consumers “still get
46 Know Your Caller Act Hearing at 76. (P.A. 0697)  The House amicus brief also mischaracterizes thestudy in the 1991 House Report as finding “just ten percent of complaints about telemarketing involvedcharitable calls,” House Br. 9, when the figure it cites applies to only one state – Rhode Island – whilethe remaining data and reservations in the Report go unmentioned.  See supra at 39.47 See, e.g. C. Mayer, Sorry Wrong Number on Registry, WASH. POST, at E1 (Oct. 18, 2003).
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political solicitations [and] nonprofit solicitations … during the so-called dinner hour … mysuspicion is that [they] would think that the legislation was a fraud.” 463. The DNCR is Not Narrowly TailoredThe government also fails to satisfy the requirement that its restriction be “no morerestrictive than necessary.”  See ULBA , 256 F.3d at 1075.  Under this requirement, it must“carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed.”Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).  Inaddition, if it could “achieve its interests in a manner that … restricts less speech, theGovernment must do so.”  Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (emphasisadded).  Indeed, the DNCR virtually ensures restriction of far more speech than necessarybecause it allows anyone with an email address to use the Internet to place multiple telephonenumbers – including those of other people – on the DNCR without their knowledge orapproval.  FTC Order at 4639; Valentine & Kennelly Affidavits. (P.A. 0734-59)  As a directresult, the DNCR will block speech to persons who have not made an individualized decisionconsenting to such a restriction on commercial telephone solicitations to their homes, 47 insharp contrast to the individual opt-out system at issue in Rowan.While it is true “least restrictive means” analysis does not apply to commercial speech,this Court has noted that the government must carefully consider the existence of obvious,more narrowly tailored alternatives in evaluating the fit between means and ends.  U S West,Inc., 182 F.3d at 1239; Revo, 106 F.3d at 935.  The government has the burden to show the
48  This Circuit does not accept agency justifications not found in its record or that are vague orinconclusive. U S West, 182 F.3d at 1239 (rejecting reliance on “common sense” and insufficientlyspecific empirical study to satisfy burden to prove narrow tailoring).  Nor has this Court accepted thetype of post hoc rationalizations that litter the government’s brief.  See ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1075.  28
required fit through an adequate factual record. 48  Here, however, in their rush to fulfill thepre-ordained conclusion of their rulemakings, the FTC and FCC ignored both thesefundamental requirements.  a. The Government Failed toAssess Regulatory Costs Neither agency made any serious effort to weigh the impact of the proposedrestriction on commercial free speech, the telemarketing industry, or the economy as whole.They had no idea, and did not bother to study, what volume of commercial telemarketingcalls the restriction would suppress, much less how many calls would be blocked thatcustomers are interested in receiving.  Although the record showed the DCNR woulddevastate the telemarketing industry, resulting in lay-offs for as much as 50 percent of theindustry, FTC Order at 4631; ATA Reply Comments at 26-30; ATA Ex Partes (all providingevidence of adverse impact) (P.A. 0077-81, 0306-22), the FTC and FCC each brushed off theevidence in a single sentence without any further inquiry.  FTC Order at 4632; FCC Order at14031, 14039.  They did so even though the TCPA, not to mention the First Amendment,requires careful consideration of these efforts.  U S West, 182 F.3d at 1238-39; ULBA , 256F.3d at 1075 (regulation is invalid where there is no indication the government “made anycareful calculation of the costs associated with its speech restrictions”).The claim that the DNCR does not restrict speech because it only allows consumersto “opt in” to a list, Gov. Br. 40, ignores the government’s own findings.   The FTCillustrated this point when it decided to subject charitable solicitations only to company-specific requirements and not the DNCR.  It stated it was:
49  The FTC agreed with non-profit organizations opposing the DNCR, finding it would be “toocostly … to obtain prospective donors’ express permission to call, and too difficult for consumers toexercise their right to hear from them.”  Consequently, it concluded the DNCR was not narrowlytailored.  Id. at 4636. 29
concerned that subjecting charitable solicitation telemarketing –along with commercial telemarketing to solicit sales of goodsand services – to national “do-not-call” registry requirementsmay sweep too broadly, because it could, for example, promptsome consumers to accept the blocking of charitable solicitationcalls that they would not mind receiving, as an undesired butunavoidable side-effect resulting from signing up for the registryto stop sales solicitation calls.FTC Order at 4636.  See id. at 4634 (citing evidence that DNCR would reduce donor pool by40 to 50 percent, and up to 80 percent in some states).  This concern is well-founded, thoughthe FTC wrongly assumed the same concerns were irrelevant with respect to all commercialcalls.  The FTC specifically found applying the national registry to nonprofits was not narrowlytailored because it would not accurately reflect specific consumer preferences. 49  Conversely,it found the company-specific approach constitutional because there is a “direct correlationbetween the governmental interest and the regulatory means employed to advance thatinterest:  The consumer requests a specific caller not to call again, and the regulation requiresthe caller to make a record of and honor that request in the future.”  Id. at 4636.The government misses the point in suggesting a ban on telemarketing or arequirement that consumers “opt in” to calls would be even more restrictive than theDNCR.  Gov. Br. 40.  Of course it would be.  But the relevant question is not whether thegovernment could have acted more restrictively, nor does the inquiry turn on the totalamount of speech it will suppress – it is whether the restriction was “more restrictive thannecessary.”  ULBA , 256 F.3d at 1075; Playboy, 30 F. Supp.2d at 718 (“The question is not thesignificance of the totality of the effects [but] the relative burden of one solution versus
30
another.”).  See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 758-759(1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate restrictions on unsolicited “indecent”speech where government failed to build record on possible alternatives).  Here, thegovernment never developed the necessary record because it had announced its preferredsolution – the DNCR – from the outset.b. The Government Failed toConside r L ess  Re stric tiveAlternatives This Court has been clear that “existence of an obvious and substantially lessrestrictive means for advancing the desired government objective indicates a lack of narrowtailoring” and that the government must build a record showing such alternatives “would notsufficiently protect … privacy.”  U S West, 182 F.3d at 1238 n. 11, 1239.  Here, thegovernment’s assertion that there are no “numerous and obvious less burdensomealternatives” to the DNCR, Gov. Br. 28, is totally undermined by its conclusion that thecompany-specific rules are substantially less restrictive and can be effective.  FTC Order at4636.  Its repeated conclusory references to “experience” to show that company-specificrules are inadequate (but only in the commercial context) mean very little where the recorddemonstrates conclusively most people were ignorant of the rules and neither the FTC norFCC ever enforced them.  See supra at 9-12.  This lack of enforcement is fatal under Central Hudson.  In Revo, for example, thisCourt held that, to justify a restriction on solicitations, the government must demonstrate“the existing regulations (or enhanced enforcement of those regulations)” would notmaterially address its objective.  106 F.3d at 936.  Here, the utter failure to enforce thecompany-specific rules not only calls into question post hoc characterizations of the record, itshows efforts to enforce the company-specific rules were an obvious, entirely untested
50  Cf. DNC-Tr. at 92 (P.A. 0576) (Vermont study indicated state agency’s education efforts had“substantial impact” on number of consumers asserting rights under existing laws to prevent unwantedtelephone calls). 31
alternative that would not restrict constitutionally protected speech.  Under Revo, failure evento evaluate whether “enhanced enforcement” of company-specific requirements wouldmaterially address the desired objective renders the DNCR invalid.  Id. at 936.Here, the record shows most consumers were unaware of the company-specificoption.  See supra at 9-10.  Thus, another obvious alternative was educating consumers aboutthe availability of this option in much the same way the government now is energeticallypublicizing the DNCR. 50   Failure to explore this obvious alternative fails Central Hudsonscrutiny.  U S West, 182 F.3d at 1239 (agency must address whether customers, if notified ofopportunity to prevent company from using their personal information, would use availableprotections).  See also Verizon Northwest v. Showalter, 2003 WL 22160434 at *6-7 (W.D. Wa.Aug. 26, 2003) (“regulations that address the form, content and timing of opt-out notices,when coupled with a campaign to inform consumers of their rights, can ensure thatconsumers are able to properly express their privacy preferences.”).  Cf. Playboy, 30 F.Supp.2dat 712 (if less restrictive alternative is not promoted “it cannot become a meaningfulalternative”).  As the Supreme Court has noted, education campaigns may be both moreeffective at advancing state interests and more narrowly tailored than speech restrictions.  See44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.To whatever extent the record shows problems with the company-specific rules,other new rules address any alleged shortcomings.  For example, the FTC added a provisionprohibiting companies from interfering with efforts to be placed on companies’ do-not-calllists.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii).  In addition, rules governing abandoned calls and Caller ID
51  FCC Order at 14041.  While some electronic devices involve modest costs, others, such as CallerID, are increasingly bundled with basic telephone service.32
address other problems the government identified in justifying the DNCR.  E.g., 16 C.F.R.§§ 310.4(b)(4), 310.4(a)(7); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(a)(6), 64.1601(e).  Before the FTC and FCCcondemn other aspects of their own new rules as somehow inadequate to fix problemsidentified with company-specific rules, they must allow these less restrictive measures to be“tested over time.”  Sable, 492 U.S. at 128-129.  In addition, the government failed to adoptother obvious and less restrictive alternatives – including postcard confirmation of company-specific requests, 800-number or Internet sign-ups, or requiring equipment necessary toreceive requests from persons with disabilities – that would have made the company-specificrequirement even more effective.  See e.g., Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 758-759.Other than acknowledging Caller ID as a valuable tool to prevent unwanted calls andbarring telemarketers from blocking Caller ID, e.g., FTC Order at 4626-27, the governmentcompletely failed to consider technological alternatives for preventing unwanted calls, asrequired by the TCPA.  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(A).  These options include call rejection and nosolicitation services, and numerous consumer devices.  See supra note 29 and accompanyingtext.  Neither agency reviewed the effectiveness of the devices except that the FCC assertedthat a few did not work well, and rejected them all on the ground that they imposed costs toconsumers, without mentioning their cost. 51  But criticisms of these technologies, Gov. Br.43-44, are entirely unsupported by the record, and precisely the sort of post hoc speculationU S West forbids.  The existence of a growing number of market-based solutions is directlyrelevant to whether new regulations provide a “reasonable fit,” particularly since the TCPA ispremised on the outdated assumption that no such technologies exist.  See supra note 29 andaccompanying text.  Additionally, the FTC and FCC chose not to publicize the entirely
33
content-neutral DMA Telephone Preference Service, which the record indicated provides4.5 million consumers with effective protection against telemarketing calls.  DMAComments at 7-8.The government contends its “layered approach” involving multiple regulatoryrequirements demonstrates narrow tailoring, Gov. Br. 42-43, but it instead creates theopposite presumption.  The overlapping rules are not “nuanced.”  They are redundant.  Thecombination of available less restrictive options shows that the government could haveserved its interests without discriminatory DNCR restrictions on commercial telemarketing.This approach was obvious and squarely before the agencies.  In fact, this is precisely whatthe FTC and FCC chose to do with regard to charitable telemarketing – i.e., rely on thoseother requirements in tandem with refined company-specific rules.  The government’s offerof a smorgasbord of regulations does not empower it to keep items on the menu that aremore restrictive than necessary.
III. THE NATIONAL DNC REGISTRY FEES VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENTIn order to create and implement the national DNCR, the FTC has imposed arevenue-based tax on First Amendment activity in violation of the Constitution.  The rulesrequire affected telemarketers to pay a fee for access to the registry as a precondition toconstitutionally-protected speech.  See generally FTC Fee Order.  By structuring its regulatoryscheme in this way, the government runs headlong into a well-established body of law inwhich the Supreme Court has shown its aversion to special taxes or fees on expressiveactivities.  It is bedrock law that no one may be “compelled to purchase, through a licensefee or a license tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution.”  Murdock v. Pennsylvania,319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (internal quote omitted).  Although the government may constitutionally impose a fee limited to the “expenseincident to the administration” of a speech regulation, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,577 (1941), the Supreme Court has held that such fees must be narrowly tailored to matchactual administrative costs.  Murdock , 319 U.S. at 113-14.  In this regard, the Court has shownparticular antipathy to taxes and fees that discriminate between speakers.  Arkansas Writers’Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (invalidating exemptions from sales taxes forreligious, professional, trade and sports magazines).
52  See FCC Order at 14031 n.101, 14036 n.123 (emphasis added).  The fee schedule alsodiscriminates among speakers without regard to administrative costs.  FTC Fee Order at 45139 (distinctcorporate divisions, etc., within company are separate sellers required to pay own fees to access registry,while unified companies placing same number of calls to same number of consumers pay once).Compare also 16 C.F.R. § 310.8(e) (exempt entities (e.g., charities, politicians, etc.) may voluntarily accessregistry free of charge), with FTC Fee Order at 45135-36 (telemarketers or other service providers mayvoluntarily access registry independent of clients on whose behalf they place calls, but must pay to doso even if the client has already bought the list). 34
Here, the government has admitted it will use a substantial portion (and perhaps most)of the funds generated by fees imposed on protected, truthful speech to pay for generalagency outreach functions and technical systems used to address “fraud-related”complaints. 52  Congress authorized the FTC to collect $18.1 million to implement theDNCR, but the FTC is paying an outside contractor only $3.5 million to administer theregistry.  Although the FTC is hazy on details, it claims the excess $14.6 million is needed tocover “agency infrastructure and administration costs, including information technologystructural supports,” and in particular, “the Consumer Sentinel system (the agency’srepository for all consumer fraud-related complaints) and its attendant infrastructure.”  FTCFee Order at 45141.  Significantly, the FTC reported to Congress recently that the vastmajority of telemarketing complaints do not relate to “do-not-call” issues at all.  Only aboutone in ten of the complaints filed with the agency about telemarketing concern unwantedtelephone calls.  See, e.g., Know Your Caller Act, supra note 2.  Accordingly, the DNCR feeschedule is an unconstitutional revenue measure.CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court affirm thejudgments of the district courts below and vacate the FCC’s new TCPA registry rules.Respectfully submitted,
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